Random Selection for Scaling Standards by Abramowicz, Michael
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review 
2021 
Random Selection for Scaling Standards 
Michael Abramowicz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abramowicz, Michael, "Random Selection for Scaling Standards" (2021). Minnesota Law Review. 3210. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3210 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 








Standards	 don’t	 scale.	 When	 adjudication	 costs	 are	 relatively	





































ards	with	 rules.	 This	Article	 explores	 a	 novel	 technique	 for	 accom-
plishing	this	goal:	allowing	claimants	to	sell	their	claims	to	intermedi-
aries	 and	 then	 distributing	 the	 government	 subsidy	 to	 the	
intermediaries	 in	proportion	to	valuation	of	a	small	number	of	ran-
domly	selected	claims.	
Consider	 a	 hypothetical	 program	 for	 which	 a	 broad	 standard	
seems	infeasible	using	conventional	regulatory	techniques:	a	legisla-
ture	 is	 considering	 a	 statute	 to	 mitigate	 climate	 change	 (perhaps	




have	 a	 significantly	 disproportionate	 effect	 on	 the	 claimant.”	 But	 if	
lower-level	bureaucrats	rendered	awards	directly	under	the	standard,	
intolerable	 inconsistency	 might	 result.8	 The	 conventional	 legal	 re-
sponse	would	be	to	approximate	the	standard	with	rules	identifying	





































experimental	 program	 many	 orders	 of	 magnitude	 smaller—that	 it	
would	 distribute	 in	 proportion	 to	 valuations	 of	 randomly	 selected	
claims	 held	 by	 intermediaries	 who	 have	 purchased	 them	 from	 the	
original	claimants.	That	is,	instead	of	allowing	every	citizen	to	make	a	




































between.	 Intermediaries	 have	 incentives	 to	 consider	 any	 facts	 that	
might	affect	valuation	and	adjust	offers	accordingly.	
An	intermediary	would	like	to	pay	as	little	as	possible	to	a	claim-






tification	 for	 regulation	 in	 that	 context	 lies	 in	 consumers’	 informa-
tional	 burden	 in	 choosing	 among	 insurance	 plans.15	 Here,	 because	






termediaries	 can	 hold	 diversified	 portfolios	 and	mitigate	 their	 risk	





















	 15.	 See,	e.g.,	 id.	at	980–81;	see	also	Daniel	Schwarcz,	Transparently	Opaque:	Un-
derstanding	 the	Lack	of	Transparency	 in	 Insurance	Consumer	Protection,	 61	UCLA	L.	
REV.	394	(2014)	(arguing	that	insurance	policies	are	not	sufficiently	transparent).	





















and	 therefore	makes	 otherwise	 impossible	 administrative	 schemes	
feasible.	 Even	 relatively	 informal,	 non-adversarial	 forms	 of	
 
	 18.	 Scholars	sometimes	worry	that	privatization	will	allow	legislators	to	achieve	











TICE	 (1988)	 (reviewing	 theories	and	research	on	procedural	 justice	and	 its	 implica-
tions	on	legal	framework);	JOHN	THIBAUT	&	LAURENS	WALKER,	PROCEDURAL	JUSTICE:	A	PSY-
CHOLOGICAL	 ANALYSIS	 (1975)	 (exploring	 how	 procedural	 justice	 is	 used	 to	 mediate	
conflicts	between	individuals	and	groups).		

















each	 member	 of	 the	 class	 has	 suffered	 relatively	 small	 damages	































	 23.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Matthew	 C.	 Stephenson,	 The	 Strategic	 Substitution	 Effect:	 Textual	
Plausibility,	Procedural	Formality,	and	Judicial	Review	of	Agency	Statutory	Interpreta-
tions,	120	HARV.	L.	REV.	528,	531	(2006)	(“Procedural	formality	is	costly	because	of	the	















































































































































































dresses	 is	 that	 of	 the	 class	 action	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 potential	
claimants,	 each	 entitled	 to	 only	 a	 small	 amount	of	 damages.46	 Such	
cases	present	the	challenge	of	how	to	distribute	the	damages	paid	by	















cussing	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 statistical	 methods	 to	 handle	 mass	 tort	 cases	 effi-
ciently).	For	example,	a	prosecution	of	a	doctor	for	Medicare	fraud	relied	on	an	analysis	
of	a	random	sample	of	patient	records.	Id.	at	303.	










suggests	 distributing	 the	damages	 among	 class	members	 chosen	 at	
random,	thus	reducing	the	total	administrative	costs	of	distribution.50	
A	recent	Supreme	Court	oral	argument	on	cy	pres	awards	considered	
the	 feasibility	of	 this	approach.51	A	 limitation	 is	 that	Lavie	assumes	
that	 the	relative	damages	of	each	plaintiff	 is	known	 in	advance	and	
thus	ignores	the	possibility	that	relative	draws	on	the	fund	could	be	
determined	through	adjudications	in	randomly	selected	cases.52	This	





bers.53	 With	 statistical	 adjudication,	 the	 courts	 would	 adjudicate	 a	
small	 percentage	 of	 randomly	 selected	 claims,54	 and	 the	 remaining	























































or	 that	 a	 defendant	 expects	 to	 pay	 on	 average	 in	 the	 Rosenberg-
Shavell	mechanism	is	roughly	equal	to	the	damages	in	the	absence	of	
the	mechanism.62	The	average	cost	of	trial	is,	however,	reduced,	be-

















































regulatory	 schemes.	 Several	 of	 these	 seek	 to	 direct	 government	
spending	to	prevent	climate	change.	Climate	change	is	a	useful	illus-
tration	of	the	power	of	random	selection	because	legal	rules	designed	


























anticipates	 future	 challenges,	 whether	 from	 climate	 change,	 other	
pandemics,	or	entirely	unexpected	emergencies.	It	argues	that	a	gov-
ernmental	damages	fund	distributed	in	this	way	might	be	less	easily	









































proof	 that	 the	 filing	was	 authorized.71	 This	 Article	will	 not	 discuss	
these	implementation	issues	in	any	further	detail.	Rather,	this	Article	
will	focus	on	the	foundational	structure	of	the	mechanism,	specifically	
the	 rules	 governing	 claim	payouts,	 addressed	 in	 Section	A,	 and	 the	
random	selection	itself,	addressed	in	Section	B.	The	principles	are	ap-
plicable	 regardless	 of	 the	 agency’s	mission,	 so	 the	 Commission	 can	


























Increased	 Tax	 Penalties	 for	 Identity	 Theft-Based	 Refund	 Fraud,	 18	 FLA.	TAX	REV.	 53	
(2015)	 (discussing	 problems	 of	 identity	 theft	 in	 taxation).	 For	 example,	 a	 video	 in	












sult,	 the	 government’s	 total	 liability	 would	 be	 uncertain.	 Such	 an	
approach	may	be	advisable	if	the	government	believes	it	important	to	
give	 full	 compensation	 to	 each	 claimant,	 rather	 than	 having	 the	
amount	of	compensation	vary	depending	on	the	number	of	claimants.	




















the	 system	will	perform	 less	well	 at	distinguishing	between	claims.	




constrained	 to	 some	minimum	 and	maximum.	 Or,	 the	 government	













vide	 some	 formula	 determining	 whether	 the	 fixed	 amount	 should	
change	 over	 time.	 The	 formula	 might,	 for	 example,	 increase	 the	






sumed	above	 that	 the	only	money	 that	 claimants	would	 receive	 for	

























achieve	greater	accuracy	 (at	 greater	expense)	 than	 the	baseline,	by	
taxing	intermediaries	on	payments	to	claimants	and	adding	the	taxes	
paid	to	the	fund	to	be	distributed	back	to	intermediaries.	The	rest	of	


































supra	note	45,	at	1073–75.	The	difference	 is	 that	different	claimants’	 lottery	 tickets	
would	have	different	values	if	randomly	selected	for	adjudication.	
	 74.	 See	Ronen	Avraham,	The	Economics	of	Insurance	Law—A	Primer,	19	CONN.	INS.	
















prevent	 concerns	 about	 corruption.78	 If	 there	 were	 worries	 that	 a	
pseudo-random	number	 generator	would	 be	 insufficiently	 random,	
the	 government	 could	 use	 quantum	 random	 number	 generation.79	
These	 techniques	are	hardly	necessary—the	government	could	 just	































	 79.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Quantum	 Random	 Numbers,	 ANU	 QRNG,	 https://qrng.anu.edu.au	
[https://perma.cc/5PG2-36J8]	(measuring	“the	quantum	fluctuations	of	the	vacuum”).	
































	 81.	 This	was	calculated	 from	a	simple	model	 in	which	 two	claims	are	sampled	
from	 1,000	 claims.	With	 sampling	 repeated	 a	 billion	 times,	 the	 lowest	 value	 claim	
earned	on	average	6.46	times	its	value,	while	the	highest	value	claim	earned	0.693	of	
its	 value.	 For	 the	 code	 that	 produced	 this	 calculation,	 see	mbabramo/ClaimSample-



































claims	 might	 dominate	 large	 ones.	 This	 exacerbates	 the	 problem	












that	 threshold,	 then	no	 intermediary	would	want	 to	buy	that	claim.	
This	 is	not	without	 its	downsides,	as	subsidies	would	effectively	be	
distributed	proportional	 to	 assessed	value	over	 $10,000,	 instead	of	
distributed	proportional	 to	 assessed	 value.	 This	 slightly	 overvalues	
large	claims	relative	to	smaller	ones,	a	tendency	that	works	in	the	op-
posite	direction	of	the	distortion	described	above.88	A	variant	on	the	












































may	be	more	obvious	with	some	of	our	 later	proposals.	For	example,	 if	 the	govern-
ment’s	 goal	 is	 to	 reward	 climate	 change	 innovation,	 then	 it	 is	 possible	 (though	un-








holds	 a	 claim	 that,	 if	 all	 claims	 were	 adjudicated,	 would	 receive	
$100,000.	But	because	of	the	random	selection	function,	the	claim	has	




the	 time,	 the	 government	would	 pay	 $100,000.	 This	 entirely	 elimi-




















































































































ments	 against	 claimants,	 and	 whether	 the	 outcome	 binding	 on	
claimants	before	a	multi-judge	tribunal	should	be	that	of	the	average	
or	median	judge.	It	also	explains	that	because	the	goal	is	to	provide	
































evant	 distinctions	 occurs	when	 regulations	 are	 crafted	 rather	 than	
when	adjudication	is	performed.	To	be	sure,	the	Goodness	and	Nice-
ness	Commission	 could	enact	 regulations	 that	would	 resolve	 issues	
large	and	small.104	But	 the	challenge	 to	which	random	selection	re-
sponds	is	the	creation	of	an	administrative	program	in	which	we	as-
sume	 that	 full	 development	 of	 regulations	 is	 not	 practical,	 because	
there	are	too	many	factual	scenarios	or	because	 it	 is	 too	difficult	 to	







	 105.	 In	 the	criminal	context,	 the	U.S.	Sentencing	Guidelines	serve	as	a	useful	re-
minder	that	the	most	ambitious	attempts	to	create	rules	to	convert	acts	(e.g.,	crimes)	

















































tive	 reaction	 to	 some	 detail,	 it	 probably	 bears	 some	 weight,	 even	
though	it	would	take	a	person	a	long	time	“thinking	slow”	to	articulate	
the	 detail’s	 relevance.107	 We	 should	 not	 assume	 that	 the	 intuitive	
 
	 106.	 See,	e.g.,	Baker	Botts	L.L.P.	v.	ASARCO	LLC,	576	S.	Ct.	2158,	2164	(2015)	(ref-
erencing	 the	 “bedrock	principle	known	as	 the	American	Rule,”	which	provides	 that	
“[e]ach	litigant	pays	his	own	attorney’s	fees”).	




























and	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 expectations	 to	 evolve	 organically	 as	
knowledge	and	information	improves.	
2. Measure	of	the	Outcome	
Once	 judges	consider	all	of	 the	evidence	 for	a	particular	 claim,	


























pool	of	 judges.	And	suppose	 that	a	small	percentage	of	 judges	have	
wildly	different	views	from	other	judges,	for	example	by	valuing	some	




of	 such	 a	 judge,	 such	 outlier	 judges	 have	 an	 outsize	 effect	 on	 the	









duce	 the	 influence	 of	 outliers.112	 Or	 perhaps,	 an	 average	 should	 be	
used	unless	it	deviates	more	than	a	certain	percent	from	the	median.		
There	is,	however,	a	separate	argument	for	using	the	median	ra-































issues.	 A	 written	 opinion	 thus	 functions	 analogously	 to	 proof	 of	
work114	and	helps	ensure	that	judges	do	not	shirk	their	responsibili-
ties	 to	 consider	 issues	 carefully.	When	 reputational	 considerations	







Constitution.115	 Written	 opinions	 also	 contribute	 to	 general	












ers	 have	 drawn	 the	 analogy	 that	 many	 institutions	 may	 bestow	 status	 based	 on	
demonstrated	proof	of	work.	See	Eugene	Wei,	Status	as	a	Service	(StaaS),	REMAINS	DAY	














valuable	 in	 part	 because	 they	 create	 at	 least	 provisionally	 binding	
rules,	constraining	 judges	and	reducing	disparity.117	But	when	deci-
sionmakers	 (here,	 the	 intermediaries)	have	strong	 incentives	 to	act	






















































concrete	 facts—for	 example,	 developing	 reasons	 why	 some	 acts	
should	or	should	not	be	rewarded	by	our	hypothetical	Goodness	and	
Niceness	Commission	and	how	much	 credit	 various	acts	 should	 re-





ations,	 but	 also	based	on	 the	 views	 that	 judges	 seem	 to	 favor—the	
probability	 that	a	 judge	will	choose	one	position	or	another.	 In	 this	
sense,	 market	 pricing	 can	 complement	 written	 opinions,	 assigning	







































One	might	view	 the	 tendency	of	prices	 to	move	with	polls	and	






the	 Senate.126	 If	 the	 agency’s	 judges	were	 inferior	 officers,	 perhaps	
they	could	be	appointed	by	“the	courts	alone,”127	thus	attenuating	po-
litical	 influence.	But	for	that	to	be	the	case,	 the	 judges	might	not	be	


















for	 reducing	 political	 influence.	 One	 approach	would	 eliminate	 the	
need	for	agency	judges.	Instead,	valuations	might	be	performed	in	fed-
eral	court,	by	federal	 judges.	The	population	of	federal	 judges	shifts	
only	 slowly	 over	 time,	 because	 the	 judges	 have	 lifetime	 appoint-
ments.129	This	would	increase	the	workload	of	the	federal	courts,	but	
because	 of	 random	 selection,	 the	 increased	 burden	 on	 the	 courts	
would	be	reasonable.	 If	 that	 is	not	 feasible,	an	alternative	approach	
might	be	to	appoint	judges	for	relatively	short	periods	of	no	more	than	













vant	expertise	 thus	depends	on	the	purpose	of	 the	subsidy	that	 the	
government	 is	distributing.	 In	some	cases,	an	 ideal	 judge	might	not	
even	 be	 a	 lawyer.	 In	 existing	 regulatory	 regimes,	 administrative	
judges	almost	always	are	lawyers	because	they	must	be	able	to	under-
stand	how	to	deal	with	diverse	legal	materials,	including	statutes,	case	
law,	 and	 regulations,	 including	 both	 substantive	 and	 procedural	
rules.132	 If	 random	 selection	 were	 used	 to	 implement	 a	 standard	
 
	 129.	 See	 Jack	 M.	 Balkin,	Why	 Liberals	 and	 Conservatives	 Flipped	 on	 Judicial	 Re-



































missible	may	not	 improve	decision-making	on	average	even	 if	 they	





























When	 arguing	 a	 randomly	 selected	 case,	 an	 intermediary	 will	

















could	be	 accomplished	by	 voluntary	 contracting,	 though,	 because	 a	
goal	 is	 to	ensure	equal	treatment	of	claimants,	 it	might	be	better	to	
create	a	general	rule	in	the	enacting	legislation.	The	“stick”	solution	









































intermediary	 in	 a	particular	 case	 in	 court.	A	more	 complex	 scheme	
might	provide	financial	incentives.	Consider,	for	example,	the	follow-
ing	variation	on	final	offer	arbitration142:	The	intermediary	is	required	
to	announce	the	valuation	that	 the	 intermediary	seeks.	The	right	 to	
oppose	the	intermediary	might	then	be	auctioned.	The	auction	winner	
















































tion	 is	 viewed	 as	 providing	 a	 public	 good—for	 example,	 because	
judges’	written	opinions	will	enrich	the	public	understanding	about	
what	 should	 count	 as	 advancing	 the	 government’s	 goals	 in	 the	
 









	 146.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Andrew	W.	McThenia	&	 Thomas	 L.	 Shaffer,	For	 Reconciliation,	 94	























efficient,	 thus	 providing	 a	 foreseeable	 cost	 advantage	 over	 govern-
mental	 adjudication	 of	 individual	 claims	 and	 discouraging	 idiosyn-











industrial	 organization,	 entry	 will	 dissipate	 supplier	 rents.150	 The	
 





































































If	 the	antitrust	 laws	are	 insufficiently	protective	 in	the	random	
selection	 context,	 one	 could	 imagine	 specific	 solutions.	A	 crude	but	
simple	 approach	would	be	 to	 limit	 any	 intermediary	 (or	 any	 set	 of	
jointly	owned	 intermediaries)162	 from	owning	more	 than	a	 set	per-
centage	of	claims.	If,	for	example,	market	share	were	limited	to	20%	
in	a	geographic	region	(perhaps	defined	at	 the	county	 level)	but	an	

























	 162.	 Recent	 antitrust	 scholarship	 has	 focused	 increasingly	 on	 the	 danger	 that	
cross-ownership	 can	 encourage	 collusion,	 even	 in	 public	 companies.	 See	 Einer	 El-






















random	 selection	would	 complicate	 the	 assessment.	 If	markets	 are	






Consumer	protection	 law	also	might	be	 tailored	to	 the	random	





selling	 their	 claims,	 they	 should	 care	 only	 about	 how	much	money	
they	receive.	There	might,	however,	be	a	role	for	government	in	defin-
ing	a	single	standard	contract	for	such	transactions,	or	for	mandating	
warnings	 for	 nonstandard	 contracts.	 For	 example,	 intermediaries	
might	be	required	to	give	consumers	disclosures	encouraging	the	con-
sumers	 to	 contact	 other	 intermediaries	 to	 obtain	 the	 best	 possible	
price.	
 
	 163.	 The	CFPB’s	website	 formerly	promised	that	 the	agency	would	ensure	“that	


























accepted	 offers,	 along	with	 some	 basic,	 nonidentifying	 information	








































Yet	perhaps	the	most	 important	protection	against	 fraud	is	 the	
incentive	of	intermediaries	to	be	vigilant.	If	an	intermediary	believes	
that	 some	 evidence	 submitted	 is	 fraudulent,	 the	 intermediary	 will	












The	argument	 that	 competition	will	drive	up	prices	 is	perhaps	
reminiscent	of	Gary	Becker’s	explanation	of	how	discrimination	cre-















Indeed,	 if	minority	 or	women	 claimants	were	 paid	 less	 than	white	
male	claimants	 for	equally	valuable	claims,	 then	intermediaries	will	
have	 incentives	to	bid	up	these	claims.	Full	acceptance	of	 this	 logic,	
however,	would	 suggest	 that	 some	 areas	 of	 antidiscrimination	 law,	
such	as	protections	against	“redlining,”	are	unnecessary.169	Such	pro-






nate	would	be	 if	 they	 expect	 that	 the	ultimate	 adjudication	 itself	 is	
likely	to	discriminate.	So	long	as	witness	credibility	is	at	issue,	judges	









nomically	 rational	 based	 on	 the	 aggregate	 characteristics	 of	 some	
group,	as	well	as	discrimination	that	is	rational	based	on	third	parties’	
anticipated	 discrimination.174	 The	 statute	 regulating	 intermediaries	
could	 explicitly	 allow	suits	based	on	 these	 theories	 and	 clarify	 that	
 











































in	an	 international	 treaty.	Rather,	 it	 is	 to	highlight	 that	distributing	






























































	 181.	 Ted	 Nordhaus	 &	Michael	 Shellenberger,	 The	 Flawed	 Logic	 of	 the	 Cap-and-










approach.185	 The	 hope	 is	 that	 a	 broad	 political	 constituency	 will	
emerge	in	support	of	policies	combatting	climate	change	once	people	
start	 receiving	 checks.186	 Others	 have	 argued	 that	 commitments	 to	















	 184.	 See,	 e.g.,	 JAMES	 A.	 BAKER,	 III,	MARTIN	 FELDSTEIN,	 TED	 HALSTEAD,	 N.	 GREGORY	
MANKIW,	HENRY	M.	PAULSON,	JR.,	GEORGE	P.	SCHULTZ,	THOMAS	STEPHENSON	&	ROB	WALTON,	


































ical	 enactability	 of	 the	 legislation,	 the	 compensation	 should	 be	 di-




This	Article’s	project	 is	 to	assume	 that	 the	goal	 is	 to	distribute	









tional	background	and	whether	 their	 family	 ties	make	 it	 feasible	 to	
move	to	other	cities.	Calculation	becomes	far	more	complex	for	indi-
rectly	affected	 individuals.	 It	 is	often	said	that	a	single	 job	supports	
 
	 190.	 Some	argue	for	offsetting	the	overall	distributional	effect	of	a	carbon	tax,	for	





















(and	 likely	 even	 if	 they	did	not),	 the	 administrative	burden	of	 pro-
cessing	 tens	or	hundreds	of	millions	of	 claims	would	be	enormous.	
Achieving	 reform	 within	 a	 conventional	 administrative	 structure	
would	thus	be	difficult.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	an	agency	included	
a	 single	 tier	 of	 decisionmakers.	 The	 resources	 required	 to	 staff	 the	













uting	 money	 made	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Fund	 less	 im-
portant.201	Due	process	was	also	 less	of	 a	 concern,	because	anyone	
could	decline	an	offer	of	compensation	and	bring	an	individual	law-
suit.202	The	climate	change	 issue,	 including	 the	question	of	who	de-






































































random	 selection	markets	 also	might	 be	 used	 for	 less	 open-ended	
measurement	challenges.	Consider,	 for	example,	 the	problem	of	up-
grading	 the	 energy	 efficiency	 of	 existing	 buildings.207	 A	 recent	 pro-
posal	 in	 the	 United	 States	 known	 as	 the	 “Green	New	Deal”	 recom-
mends,	among	other	things,	upgrading	the	energy	efficiency	of	every	
building	 in	 the	 country.208	 Yet	 the	 government	 will	 inevitably	 face	















for	 energy	 upgrades	 paid	 for	 in	 a	 particular	 year,	 and	 then	 if	 that	
proves	successful,	it	might	increase	the	size	of	the	fund	to	hundreds	of	
billions	 of	 dollars,	 without	 necessarily	 increasing	 the	 size	 of	 the	
agency	adjudicating	claims.	As	the	program	scales,	each	claim	is	less	
likely	 to	 be	 randomly	 selected,	 and	 randomly	 selected	 claims	 earn	
more,	but	the	adjudicative	task	stays	essentially	the	same.	The	govern-





portunities-and-challenges#	 [https://perma.cc/89HG-477M]	 (“Upgrading	 building	
shells	and	heating	and	cooling	equipment,	mostly	 in	existing	homes,	 represents	 the	
largest	opportunity”	for	residential	sector	energy	savings.”).	
	 208.	 See	Salvador	Rizzo,	What’s	Actually	in	the	‘Green	New	Deal’	from	Democrats?,	
















ucts,	 such	 as	 cars,	 appliances,	 and	 building	 materials.211	 Then,	 the	
agency	might	devise	a	formula	for	determining	total	energy	savings	
based	on	the	item	being	replaced	and	the	replacement.	Ideally,	such	a	





gamed.	 A	 taxpayer	 might	 claim	 nonexistent	 upgrades.	 Thus,	 the	
agency	might	need	to	create	a	nationwide	corps	of	building	inspectors,	










mediaries	 to	 find	 low-cost	 ways	 to	 verify	 the	 accuracy	 of	 claimed	
 







up	 against	 the	 Betz	 limit.	 See	 generally	 Betz	 Limit,	 ENERGY	 EDUC.,	 https://	
energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Betz_limit	 [https://perma.cc/JDE5-V9DS]	 (defin-
ing	Betz	limit	as	the	“theoretical	maximum	efficiency	for	a	wind	turbine”).	




	 212.	 See	generally	Peter	 J.	May	&	Robert	S.	Wood,	At	the	Regulatory	Front	Lines:	


















other	 technologies	 to	 combat	 or	 adapt	 to	 climate	 change.215	 Yet	 it	
would	also	be	possible	for	a	fund	to	be	used	directly	to	reward	suc-






fifty	 years.	The	 example	 illustrates	 that	 intermediaries	need	not	be	
paid	right	away;	so	long	as	they	will	eventually	be	paid	with	interest,	
they	will	have	 incentives	 to	buy	up	claims.	 Intermediaries	can	seek	
further	 funding	 from	capital	markets,	 either	by	 selling	equity	or	by	
seeking	 out	 loans.	 Capital	 market	 funders	 of	 intermediaries	 would	





batting	 climate	 change.217	 The	 limited	duration	 of	 patents	makes	 it	
 
	 214.	 See	5	U.S.C.	§	553.	
	 215.	 Mary	 Beth	 Gallagher,	The	 Race	 to	 Develop	 Renewable	 Energy	 Technologies,	
MIT	 NEWS	 (Dec.	 18,	 2019),	 https://news.mit.edu/2019/race-develop-renewable	
-energy-technologies-1218	 [https://perma.cc/7T5T-SK2E]	 (identifying	 the	 need	 for	
energy	technologies	and	specific	growing	fields).	








































































mediaries	with	 random	selection	ensure	 that	 claimants	 can	 receive	
appropriate	compensation	even	with	uncertain	valuations,	so	too	can	
capital	markets	 ensure	adequate	payment	 to	 inventors	 in	a	 reward	
system.		
Yet	a	significant	administrative	problem	remains	unaddressed	in	
the	 literature:	 Is	 it	 feasible	 for	 the	 government	 to	 adjudicate	 every	
















































Facts	 for	 2020,	 SUPPLEMENTS	 101	 (Apr.	 1,	 2020),	 https://supplements101.net/	

















	 239.	 See	 Magnus	 Gulbrandsen	 &	 Richard	 Woolley,	Measuring	 Impact:	 Methods,	
Challenges	and	Biases,	U.	OSLO:	OSIRIS	BLOG	(Apr.	5,	2018),	https://www.sv.uio.no/tik/	
english/research/centre/osiris/osirisblog/measuring-impact.html	[https://perma	






















anticipate	 this,	 they	will	 pay	more	 to	buy	 claims	 for	basic	 research	
than	they	should	relative	to	applied	research.	But	 if	one	anticipates	
that	 intermediaries	 will	 incorporate	 into	 their	 calculations	 a	 bias	
against	applied	research,	then	perhaps	one	should	also	anticipate	that	
the	ultimate	decisionmakers	will	 recognize	 the	possibility	of	 such	a	
bias.	If	so,	then	those	decisionmakers	should	be	able	to	self-correct	by	

































may	 be	 so	 large	 that	 the	 administrative	 challenges	 of	 creating	 the	
grant-making	agency	may	be	overwhelming.250	Second,	especially	if	a	
large	 sum	 of	 money	 is	 involved,	 a	 grant-making	 agency	 may	 face	
strong	political	pressures,	for	example,	to	allocate	funding	to	particu-
lar	regions.251	By	delaying	the	eventual	distribution	of	a	fund,	political	







difficult	 a	 problem	 is	 that	 any	 governmental	 responses	 must	 ulti-
mately	 affect	 individuals	with	 heterogeneous	 circumstances.253	 For	



























serious	damage	when	 it	occurs.254	 If	past	disasters	and	 the	corona-
virus	pandemic	are	a	guide,	the	government	might	decide	to	pay	com-
pensation	to	those	especially	harmed	by	climate	change.255	A	random	


















11,	 2014,	 3:04	 PM),	 https://www.businessinsider.com/effects-of-climate-change	








perma.cc/44PP-Q4M8]	 (displaying	 the	amount	of	 funds	 that	FEMA	has	given	 to	 the	
survivors	of	Hurricane	Irma	for	various	purposes,	including	rental	payments	and	home	
repairs).	
































to	 the	 claimants	 or	 how	much	 loss	 the	 claimants	 suffered.	Alterna-
tively,	we	might	conceive	of	charities	as	the	claimants,	with	a	claim	for	
every	type	of	relief	granted.	The	charities	might	then	hold	on	to	the	
claims,	 if	 large	 enough,	 or	 sell	 them	 to	 intermediaries	 aggregating	
claims	from	multiple	charities.	However	conceptualized,	this	system	
would	allow	for	consideration	of	the	relative	merits	of	different	types	




















perma.cc/SS9X-23K2]	 (proclaiming	 that	estimates	 for	 lost	 jobs	during	 the	spring	of	
2020	ranged	from	20	to	40	million).	











for	 the	 pandemic.268	 In	 comparison	 to	 spending	 on	 individual	 cash	
payments,	 the	 government	 spent	 relatively	 little	money	 on	 ventila-
tors,269	which	seemed	that	they	might	save	many	lives	(though	turned	
out	not	to	help	as	much	as	initially	thought),270	or	on	respirators	and	
other	 protective	 equipment.271	 Even	 though	 face	masks	 greatly	 re-




















Overused	 for	 COVID-19,	 STAT	 (Apr.	 8,	 2020),	 https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/	
08/doctors-say-ventilators-overused-for-covid-19	[https://perma.cc/4BMU-Q492]	






	 272.	 See	The	 Simple	 Science	Behind	Why	Masks	Work,	HEALTHLINE,	 https://www	
.healthline.com/health-news/the-simple-science-behind-why-masks-work	 [https://	







gram	would	 allow	 the	 country	 to	 reduce	 transmission	 of	 the	 virus	
more	quickly,275	yet	the	government	monopolized	and	botched	test-
ing276	and	offered	no	inducements	to	private	firms.	The	government	
relied	more	on	 threats	 to	mandate	production	 through	 the	Defense	



















NEWS	 (Apr.	 13,	 2020),	 https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/test-trace	
-how-u-s-could-emerge-coronavirus-lockdowns-n1182626	 [https://perma.cc/M9LT	
-H45P]	 (explaining	 how	 states	 can	 use	 testing	 and	 tracing	 to	 reduce	 the	 spread	 of	
COVID-19	and	relax	lockdowns	and	other	restrictions).	
	 276.	 See	 Michael	 D.	 Shear,	 Abby	 Goodnough,	 Sheila	 Kaplan,	 Sheri	 Fink,	 Katie	
Thomas	&	Noah	Weiland,	The	Lost	Month:	How	a	Failure	To	Test	Blinded	 the	U.S.	 to	
Covid-19,	N.Y.	TIMES,	https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus	























up	 an	 administrative	 program,	 deciding	what	 to	 purchase,	 in	what	
quantities,	and	to	whom	to	distribute	it,	especially	if	corruption	and	
cronyism	are	 to	 be	 avoided.	However,	 a	market	 approach	 could	 be	
scaled	 up	 quickly,	 without	 precisely	 determining	 what	 to	 spend	


















private	organizations	are	better	 than	 the	government	at	 identifying	
how	 ex	 ante	 expenditures	 might	 be	 useful	 in	 a	 disaster,	 then	 this	
 
-our-communities-from-covid-19	 [https://perma.cc/X25A-8CEM]	 (detailing	 how	
state	leaders	have	endangered	incarcerated	populations	and	communities	as	a	whole	
with	their	failure	to	adhere	to	warnings	and	take	action).	






OPPORTUNITIES	TO	 IMPROVE	 THE	EFFICIENCY,	EFFECTIVENESS,	 AND	 SUSTAINABILITY	 OF	 THE	
CDC	 STRATEGIC	 NATIONAL	 STOCKPILE	 (2016),	 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/	
NBK396382/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK396382.pdf	[https://perma.cc/9ELF-DMVR].		
	 282.	 See	Roche	Introduces	Program	To	Facilitate	Corporate	Pandemic	Stockpiling	of	









mobilize	resources	 in	hopes	of	selling	 to	 the	government	under	 the	
status	quo,	but	this	is	made	more	burdensome	by	the	difficulty	of	con-
























	 287.	 See,	 e.g.,	Alistair	 J.	Woodward	&	 Jonathan	M.	Samet,	Climate	Change,	Hurri-
canes,	and	Health,	108	AM.	J.	PUB.	HEALTH	33	(2018).	
	 288.	 See,	e.g.,	Coasts,	U.S.	CLIMATE	RESILIENCE	TOOLKIT,	https://toolkit.climate.gov/	




















might	 be	 implemented	 at	 the	 state,292	 national,293	 or	 international	
level.294	 Larger-scale	 implementation	may	 be	 ethically	 justified	 be-
cause	some	regions	may	suffer	considerably	greater	losses	than	other	









mediaries	 will	 price	 claims	 by	 averaging	 various	 possible	 results.	
Meanwhile,	it	may	be	easier	to	arrive	at	an	agreement	ex	ante,	for	the	
general	 reason	 that	 it	 is	easier	 for	 legislatures	 to	pass	 statutes	 that	
 
	 291.	 See,	e.g.,	Jeremy	Patashnik,	The	Trolley	Problem	of	Climate	Change:	Should	Gov-




	 292.	 Cf.	 Montana	 COVID-19	 Fund,	 MONT.	 CMTY.	 FOUND.,	 https://www.mtcf.org/	














AND	HUMAN	SYSTEMS	 256	 (2018),	 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/	












punt	 significant	decisions	 to	 administrative	 agencies.297	 Because	 an	
agency	can	operate	based	on	a	relatively	simple	standard,	special	in-
terest	 provisions	 will	 be	 more	 obvious.	 This	 makes	 it	 more	 likely,	
though	not	inevitable,	that	giveaways	might	be	avoided.	One	approach	
might	be	to	provide	modest	funding	early	on,	ideally	under	a	standard	


































	 302.	 See	generally	Sarah	Strochak,	 Jun	Zhu	&	Laurie	Goodman,	Too	Many	Home-
owners	Lack	Flood	Insurance,	but	Many	Buy	It	Voluntarily,	URB.	INST.:	URB.	WIRE	(Sept.	
18,	 2018),	 https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/too-many-homeowners-lack-flood	
-insurance-many-buy-it-voluntarily	 [https://perma.cc/WW7G-9GLB]	 (revealing	 that	










sation	 fund.	 The	 random	 selection	 fund	 might	 provide	 for	










cial	 Security	Administration.304	But	 institutions	 that	have	used	 ran-
dom	selection	have	generally	used	it	as	a	means	of	measuring	deci-




selection	of	 claimants	 in	proportion	 to	adjudicated	valuations,	 then	
the	 independence	of	government	decisionmakers	need	not	be	com-



































ticle	 has	 focused	 on	 just	 one	 type	 of	 task:	 the	 distribution	 of	
government	funds.	This	does	not	address	the	many	other	tasks	that	
administrative	agencies	perform,	including	the	assessment	of	taxes	or	
fees.306	Random	selection	 is	a	mechanism	that	can	be	used	to	disci-
pline	any	type	of	decision-making	in	which	governmental	officials	ex-
ercise	considerable	discretion.	The	possibility	that	random	selection	
might	serve	as	a	substitute	for	rules	as	a	mechanism	for	preventing	
discretion	from	leading	to	arbitration	and	consistent	decision-making	
has	previously	been	disregarded	in	the	 legal	 literature,	and	govern-
ment	spending	is	but	one	area	in	which	this	tool	might	usefully	be	de-
ployed.	
 
	 306.	 One	might	wonder	whether,	instead	of	a	rules-based	carbon	tax	focused	solely	
on	some	forms	of	pollution,	random	selection	could	facilitate	a	tax	scheme	embodying	
all	activities	contributing	to	global	warming.	A	random	selection	system	allowing	taxes	
to	be	calculated	based	on	a	standard	would	reflect	some	of	the	same	logic	as	is	consid-
ered	here	but	also	would	present	unique	issues.	I	address	these	challenges	in	Michael	
Abramowicz,	Ian	Ayres	&	Yair	Listokin,	Randomizing	Law,	152	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	929,	997–
1001	(2011),	which	discusses	the	difficulties	that	can	come	with	implementing	a	tax	
scheme	that	uses	random	assignment.		
